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Does Parliament Matter in New Democracies? 
 
The Case of South Africa 1994-20001 
 
 
 
The third democratisation wave has included a major growth in parliamentary 
democracies. We have witnessed a significant institutionalisation of legislatures in 
new democracies in the 1990s. Scholarly interest has also expanded, especially related 
to East and Central Europe (see e.g., Ágh 1995). These studies have concluded that 
legislatures have been important in the democratisation process with consequences for 
the political systems. However, most studies of parliaments are still focused on the 
Western experience, and more particularly the experiences of just two institutions: 
The British House of Commons and the U.S. Congress (Esaiasson and Heidar 2000). 
Few studies of parliaments in poor countries in the South are available (Norton and 
Ahmed 1999 is an important exemption). In particular, studies of parliaments in Sub-
Saharan Africa are almost non-existent. 
 
This paper provides a case study of the South African parliament from the first 
democratic elections in 1994 to the present. We will examine both the external 
environment and internal characteristics of parliament and provide a description of the 
institution. The second part of the paper discusses the role of the dominant ruling 
party in the evolvement of parliament. We also hope to be able to contribute to a 
further understanding of the role of parliaments in new democracies, particularly in 
poor African countries. South Africa may appear as a special case in an African 
context – it has more resources and a stronger parliament than most others – but it has 
been an important symbol and model for many African legislatures seeking to define 
a new role for themselves. 
 
South Africa appears as a highly qualified democracy with a strong legislature and 
well designed political institutions and practices.  Its Constitution is widely seen as a 
“state-of-the-art” constitution with innovative features and a range of independent 
watchdog agencies and commissions, guaranteeing the classic civil and political rights 
as well as an array of socio-economic rights, all guarded by a relatively strong 
Constitutional Court. South Africa has also run two national elections and two sets of 
local government elections, all largely peaceful and judged to be free and fair.  
 
                                                        
1 Paper prepared for the Norwegian Political Science Conference, Hønefoss 10 – 12 January 2001 
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South African Parliamentarism – key features 
 
The 1993 interim constitution – which paved the way for South Africa’s first 
democratic election in 1994 – and the 1996 final constitution prescribed the basic 
structures and powers of Parliament. Both constitutions outlined a parliamentary 
system with a sharp division of power between the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. The new legislature was also given a particularly strong role in the political 
system. For the incoming regime, the ANC and its allies, it became the symbol of 
popular participation and people’s power. For the outgoing ancien regime, it was 
important to introduce as much constraints on executive power as possible.2 
 
The net result was the adoption of a strong Constitution anchored in the principle of 
separation of power and a Bill of Rights. Parliamentarism – the principle of 
parliamentary oversight and the election of government through elections to the 
legislature – was considered crucial. The system also included significant checks and 
balances, especially through the strong position given to the Constitutional Court. 
Presidentialism with its separate election of the head of government and a stronger 
executive was never considered a preferred option although it is common in most new 
African democracies. On the other hand: the South African President is in a powerful 
position compared with the norm for the executive in parliamentary systems of 
government, leading some to classify the South African also as “quasi-
presidentialism” (Gloppen 1997).    
 
The constitution also prescribed a bicameral parliament. In addition to the main 
National Assembly a National Council of Provinces (NCOP) was set up in 1996 (it 
replaced the Senate that existed under the interim constitution from 1994 to 1996). 
The role of the NCOP (90 seats) is limited to representing provincial interests at the 
national level. In many ways it is also an expression of the (weak) federal aspect of 
the South African constitution. 
 
Powers 
 
The National Assembly (400 seats) shall according to the Constitution pass, initiate or 
prepare legislation, ensure executive accountability and exercise oversight over 
organs of the state. The interim constitution was vague in specifying the meaning of 
“legislative authority”. This was taken further in the 1996 Constitution, which more 
strongly asserted their rights to exercise their oversight role of the executive. The new 
Constitution gave Parliament a wide mandate and extensive powers to influence 
public policy making (cf. South Africa 1996). The Constitution focused both on the 
legislative aspects of parliament – its role in shaping policy – and on its role in 
monitoring and controlling the executive’s implementation of policy.  
 
The National Assembly elects the State President from among its members. The 
President selects the Deputy President and any number of Cabinet Ministers from the 
                                                        
2 An important source of information on Parliament is emanating from the Parliamentary Monitoring 
Project of a South African NGO, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. Much of this information 
is summarised in Calland (1999). See also Kotzé (1996) for an early discussion of the new Parliament. 
A good overview and introduction is provided in Lodge 1999 with supplementary aspects on policy-
making in Centre for Development and Enterprise (1999)   
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Assembly. No more than two Ministers can be selected from outside the Assembly. 
The Ministers retain their seats in Parliament while serving in the Cabinet. The 
Assembly can, by simple majority, pass a vote of no confidence and force the 
President and any Cabinet Minister to resign. The President and Cabinet have no 
power to dissolve Parliament before the expiring of its term. The Assembly can only 
be dissolved after three years if supported by a majority of the members.  (This is a 
strengthening of Parliament compared to the interim constitution, where the President 
had the right to dissolve Parliament and call an election if a vote of no confidence was 
passed against the Cabinet and the President.) 
  
The President based on nomination from Parliament appoints a number of external 
statutory watchdog committees to protect the Constitution and monitor executive 
power. These include the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the Human Rights 
Commission and others. Among them is also the temporary Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. The Auditor-General and the Public Protector must be supported by 60 
per cent of the members of the National Assembly (down from 75 per cent in the 
interim constitution) and by a simple majority in the case of the others. 
  
The powers of Parliament can in principle only be over-ridden by the courts (although 
the external bodies created to support the Constitution may provide some 
complications here). Only the judiciary, and in the last instance the Constitutional 
Court, can review legislation and decisions and declare them null and void if judged 
to be unconstitutional.  The Constitutional Court is given extensive powers and is an 
important body in South African politics. It can rule on all constitutional matters and 
all matters relevant to the constitution, and has the power to determine whether a 
matter is of such relevance. It is given the authority to decide that Parliament or the 
President has failed to comply with a constitutional duty, and to decide disputes 
between organs of the state. Its eleven judges are appointed for a period of 12 years 
(Cf. Gloppen 1997).  
 
Institutional characteristics 
 
The internal characteristics of South African Parliament are also important. Its mode 
of operation and procedures were completely revamped from 1994. At one level 
South Africa has a long and parliamentary tradition, largely based on the Westminster 
model, but it catered only for the small minority. The previous parliament was 
generally passive and plenary-oriented. It was also only in session during parts of the 
year. It changed almost overnight from a part-time, cynical rubber-stamp organ to a 
full-time vibrant place of work. It is now in session almost the whole year and the role 
of the committees have changed dramatically (Calland 1999). 
 
The parliamentary committees have become the engine room of Parliament. Today, 
there are more than 50 committees made up of the 27 portfolio committees of the 
national assembly (which shadow government departments); 14 select committees of 
the NCOP; seven joint standing committees (covering issues such as finance and 
defence); two joint committees; and a fluctuating number of ad hoc committees. The 
committees vary in size, but normally count between 15 and 25, with members 
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appointed by party whips in proportion to the parties representation in the assembly, 
save that the smallest parties are entitled to at least one member per committee.3 
 
The Parliament has also strongly emphasised that it wants to be an open and 
accessible institution. All meetings of the parliamentary committees are thus open to 
public. In consultation with Parliament the committee meetings are systematically 
monitored by NGOs. Unofficial summaries of the proceedings and copies of all 
documents submitted or presented are available on an NGO homepage. Through the 
committees Parliament has also strongly emphasised hearings as a way of securing 
public input from civil society and interest groups as well as from senior government 
officials. 
 
Some institutional features – e.g. the role of the speaker or the party whip, or 
parliamentary questions and motions – may be rooted in the Westminster tradition, 
but as a whole procedures and mode of operation have moved rapidly away from the 
Westminster heritage.  
 
The energy and enthusiasm that characterised the new Parliament in 1994 was not 
accompanied by the necessary staff, infrastructure or training. MPs as well as 
committees faced shortages of technical, research and administrative resources. This 
placed the legislature at a disadvantage both in terms of scrutinising legislation and in 
being able to develop the active role suggested by its constitutional powers. 
 
The development of Parliament’s institutional and procedural rhythm was disturbed 
twice. First, as the Constitutional Assembly, Parliament was required to complete the 
Constitution between May 1994 and May 1996. This took precedence over normal 
parliamentary work and absorbed much of the intellectual energy of many influential 
MPs. Secondly, following the adaptation of the final Constitution, the NCOP replaced 
the old Senate. Setting up the new structures and procedures for the second chamber 
proved time-consuming. 
 
There was also an unsettling high turnover of key individuals. 122 of the 400 National 
Assembly members had left by the time the 1994 Parliament’s term ended in March 
1999. 13 of the original 27 National Assembly portfolio committee chairpersons had 
also resigned during the period. Such resignations were destabilising, particularly 
because the majority of MPs who left were leaders in the new Parliament. (Most left 
for senior positions in government, the private or the parastatal sector). 87 of the 266 
(33 per cent) of the ANC MPs elected in the 1999 election were new (Calland 
1999:77). 
 
Another dimension to the role of Parliament is the physical separation and distance 
between the executive and Parliament. The government is located in Pretoria while 
the Parliament is in Cape Town, some 1500 km away. This may weaken the ability to 
monitor the executive, but it also has negative implications for the government. With 
Parliament in session almost all the time this implies that Cabinet Ministers and their 
senior officials commute frequently between the two cities. Often they spend two 
                                                        
3 Information on all the committees, unofficial summaries of their meetings and copies of all 
submissions are available from the homepage of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, a joint project of 
three South African NGOs. See http://www.pmg.org.za   
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days a week in Cape Town. It is a public secret that the ANC leadership would like to 
move Parliament to Pretoria. 
   
  
Political context    
 
South Africa held democratic elections to Parliament in 1994 and 1999. They both 
confirmed the ANC’s dominant position. The party captured nearly two-thirds of the 
votes in both elections. Almost all votes came from black Africans and from the two 
minority groups, Indians and Coloureds. The party got 62.65 per cent in 1994 and 
66.35 percent in 1999. The other significant parties were the old apartheid party, the 
National Party (now New National Party) with 20.39 (1994) and 6.87 per cent (1999), 
the Democratic Party with 1.73 and 9.56 per cent, and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) with 10.54 and 8.58 per cent. The NNP and DP get virtually all their support 
from whites and some from coloureds and Indians, while almost all IFP voters can be 
found among Zulu-speakers in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal. Party political 
support is thus clearly correlated with racial and ethnic identities (Reynolds 1999). 
 
The voter support is translated into an almost identical distribution of seats in the 
Assembly. The interim constitution introduced a list-system form of proportional 
representation. This electoral system was retained in the new Constitution. The 
number of seats allocated to parties in the legislature is proportional to the number of 
votes each party wins in the election. The electoral model adopted has also implied 
that the Assembly has a number of very small parties. In the current Parliament there 
are 13 parties represented in the Assembly. Eight of these have fewer than 1.5 per 
cent of the votes behind them. The smallest (AZAPO) has 0.17 per cent of the votes 
and one seat. 
 
The position of the political parties has been significantly strengthened by an anti-
defection clause in the Constitution. MPs who resign or who are expelled from the 
party lose their seats. The parliamentary seats belong to the party, not the individual 
MP. This has emerged as a powerful mechanism to ensure party discipline. 
 
The interim constitution provided for a coalition between all the main parties. The 
National Party later withdrew, but the IFP has opted to stay on, also after the 1999 
election. Combined with a weak and fragmented party-political opposition in the 
Assembly and smaller parties allied to the ANC, this has tended to reinforce the 
ANC’s dominant position in Parliament. 
 
The electoral system has also had an important impact on the composition of the 
parliamentary groups and the profile of the MPs. It has probably led to more female 
MPs and, in the case of the ANC, to a stronger representation of the political left, than 
would otherwise have been the case. More importantly, it has probably had significant 
implications for the racial and ethnic composition of Parliament. The list-system has 
helped ensure that the parties include minority groups (and in the case of the “white” 
parties majority groups) among the candidates. The ANC, although supported 
predominantly by blacks, now has a significant “overrepresentation” of whites, 
coloureds and Indians in its parliamentary group. The “white” parties also have a few 
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“non-whites” among their MPs, and the IFP can count a significant number of “non-
Zulus” among its parliamentarians.  
 
A note should be made of the strong external interest and involvement in the new 
South African parliament. The end of apartheid also coincided with a rapidly growing 
interest among aid donors in democracy assistance. This also led to efforts to assist 
new legislatures. South Africa and the South African Parliament became a significant 
recipient of this new donor interest. Technical assistance, training programmes for 
MPs and parliamentary staff, infrastructure support, etc. became important tools. Even 
a small donor like Norway was involved. Through a South African NGO it provided 
administrative and research support to the portfolio committee on Foreign Affairs; it 
funded NGOs involved in parliamentary monitoring; and it hosted delegations of 
South African parliamentarians on study tours to Norway. As expected most donors 
tended to focus on aspects of the South African parliament which resembled the 
parliaments in their home country. 
   
Parliament and decision-making 
 
The Constitution has provided the South African Parliament with formal and 
substantive powers enabling it to play an important role both in overseeing executive 
power and in shaping public policy. This has also guided the institutionalisation of the 
Parliament. It has clearly wanted to play the role envisaged by the Constitution. In 
assessing Parliament, it is also important to re-emphasise that it had to determine its 
role at a time when the institution itself was being transformed. Any assessment of its 
role and performance must therefore take account of this rapid institutional change, 
the shortage of resources to accommodate such change, and an unsettling high 
turnover of key individuals (Calland 1999). 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that decision-making within the executive branch 
traditionally has been centralised and closed. Government departments tend to be 
large and highly specialised, and the bureaucrats, although heavily politicised, have 
largely been subservient and loyal to the Minister and Cabinet. Following the 1994 
election far-reaching public sector reforms had to take place. It was also important to 
merge and rationalise racially and ethnically divided departments, and – through a 
process of affirmative action – to alter the composition of the civil service, especially 
at the senior level. These changes have, however, not significantly altered the 
centralised nature of executive decision-making although the process may have 
become more transparent and open (Centre for Development and Enterprise 1999). 
 
The role of the first parliament has by almost any standard been impressive. Most 
importantly, of course, was the 1994-1996 drafting of the new Constitution. In this 
work note must be given to the efforts to secure popular participation in the process 
(cf. the semi-official presentation in Ebrahim 1998). This Constitution, as we have 
pointed out above, was “state-of-the-art” and gave the legislature strong powers and 
contained a number of innovations intended to strengthen democratic control over the 
executive. 
 
The new Parliament was also very active in passing new legislation. Some 530 acts 
were passed in the 1994-1999 period. This was perhaps not surprising – it tends to be 
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an important feature of parliaments in new democracies – but in South Africa new 
legislation was particularly important because of the need to abolish old apartheid 
laws. We also note that in some areas parliament was particularly active in shaping 
and in many instances also in drafting the new legislation. This was especially the 
case with the portfolio committee on justice, which amended more legislation than 
any other committee. Often they took the initiative and were responsible for major 
changes in the law. The Minister of Justice often trusted the committee to rewrite his 
legislation (Calland 1999, Lodge 1999: Ch. 6). Portfolio committees, such as defence 
and education, have also been particularly active along similar lines. Other 
committees were more passive and not able to clearly find a role for themselves in 
shaping legislation and policy. 
 
This illustrates an important feature of Parliament’s role in enacting new legislation. 
The committees and the Ministers/Cabinet worked closely together, sometimes seeing 
themselves as an alliance against the old bureaucracy and the opposition parties. The 
success of such alliances appears to have been based on technical skills within the 
committees and close personal relations between the Minister and the key people in 
the committee. In the case of the justice committee, its influence was based on the 
skills of the committee chair (Johnny de Lange) and another influential member 
(Willie Hofmeyer) who were prominent ANC lawyers and had established close 
relations with the Minister (Dullah Omar) in the pre-1994 period.  
 
The parliament also gradually paid increasing attention to controlling policy 
implementation. This was a reflection both of the decrease of the function of 
legislation in shaping policies as well as perceived needs to more closely monitor 
executive administration and implementation. The means to do so were the traditional 
ones such as plenary debates, reports to Parliament, questions and interpellations and 
so on. Increasingly, the emphasis was placed on the committees and the use of public 
hearings, but also on the exterior organisations created by the Parliament/the 
Constitution (the Auditor General, the Public Protector, the Human Rights 
Commission and others). 
 
In the area of excecutive oversight we also witness high activity and a parliament 
demonstrating its willingness to confront the executive arm. But again the experiences 
are mixed. To some extent this can be explained by the consequences of inexperience, 
but more importantly by the role of the senior leadership in the dominant party, which 
has put constraints on the MPs. This brings us to a discussion of the role of party 
groups in Parliament and the future of Parliamentarism in a one-party dominant 
system.    
  
Parliament’s ability to exercise its powers is, most importantly, dependent upon the 
control exercised by party groups. Fairly coherent party groups can be said to be a 
necessary condition for electoral accountability. Parties facilitate the aggregation of 
views within parliament and may provide some institutionalisation. However, if the 
party completely dominates parliamentary behaviour, the potential for independent 
action by MPs is limited. In the South African case the governing party has a very 
dominant position – it occupies nearly two-third of the seats. The Constitution also 
provides the party with additional statutory powers and the anti-defection clause, to 
maintain party discipline and cohesion. 
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The opposition parties are also weak and fragmented. Their support base is confined 
to specific minority groups and they have not succeeded in presenting a policy 
alternative to the government. For the foreseeable future it is unlikely that the 
opposition will be able to force the ANC out of office. This does not suggest that the 
opposition in Parliament is irrelevant or that is has no influence. Of particular 
importance is perhaps the opposition parties’ ability to retain the support of powerful 
constituencies whose support the ANC needs. It is also important that the ANC does 
not generally pursue a policy of “delegitimasing” the opposition parties (Friedman 
1999, Butler 2000).4       
 
Parliament and one-party dominance 
 
Heidar and Koole (2000) draw attention to both macro and micro explanations in their 
study of variation in parliamentary party groups. At the macro level ( the national 
political system) they identify three central factors: the Constitution, the party system 
and the political culture. We have already noted how the Constitution, supplemented 
by parliamentary rules and regulations, gives the party groups a particularly strong 
position in the South African Parliament. The second factor, the party system and the 
cleavages sustaining it, is also important. The ideological distance between the parties 
and the governing party’s aim of radically changing and transforming the political 
system encourages top down decision-making and strong discipline. 
 
Political culture is also important. South Africa may not have one political culture, but 
several, although overlapping – especially at the national level. The impact of 
poverty, underdevelopment and scarce resources, is a breeding ground for 
patrimonialism and clientilism with politics often appearing as a zero-sum game. The 
ANC has certainly also been affected by this and has attracted its share of members 
primarily concerned with the hope of getting access to positions and resources. This is 
evident at all levels of the organisation, but especially at local and provincial level, 
particularly in the former bantustan territories. This has been an important factor 
behind the call for party discipline. 
 
There are also important explanations to the variation in parliamentary party groups to 
be sought at the micro-level (the party as a whole). In the South African context it is 
important to recognise the size, age and origin of the ruling ANC. The ANC is a large 
mass party with an external power base. It was established in 1912, but only got it its 
parliamentary group in 1994. This has led to a stricter and more institutionalised 
regulation of group activities. The role of external organisations – in particular ANC’s 
alliance with the trade union movement and the communist party, which sponsors a 
significant number of MPs – has also added to influence of the party over the 
parliamentary party group. A typical manifestation of this is the decision before the 
1999 election that selection of ANC candidates for the position as Premier in the 
various Provinces, as well as the Mayor of the big cities, shall be made by the national 
leadership. Such decisions should no longer be made by the ANC caucus in the 
elected assemblies.   
                                                        
4 Not all academic observers agree with this. Some (e.g. Giliomee and Simkins 1999) argue that South 
Africa is a less benign type of one-party dominance. In contrast with dominant parties in advanced 
industrial democracies which serve as transition agencies towards more competitive party politics, the 
dominant ANC in South Africa is a representing a bridgehead to authoritarian government.   
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The role of ideology is perhaps the most important factor in explaining the ANC’s 
approach to work in parliament and the operation of its parliamentary group. 
Traditionally the ANC has had a rather dismissive attitude to the formal procedures of 
“bourgeois” democracy. This has often led to a willingness among central ANC 
leaders to blur the distinction between the party and the state and to view any 
opposition as counter-revolutionary attempts to frustrate transformation (Lodge 
1999). This is changing with the emergence within the ANC of a cadre of professional 
parliamentary politicians exercising more and more weight and influence. 
 
Managing discipline 
 
The ANC exercises discipline over its MPs through several means. Most important is 
of course constitutional and parliamentary rules (e.g., the anti-defection clause and the 
role of party whips). This is intended to ensure that the MPs pursue party policy as 
defined by the ANC leadership through the National Working Committee and the 
National Executive. Formal channels and institutions have also been established to 
facilitate communication between the party and its parliamentary representatives.5 
 
Within the parliamentary group the highest organ is the ANC Caucus which normally 
meets once a week when parliament is in session. This is the forum intended to ensure 
that the ANC MPs have a common view on the major issues to be discussed in 
Parliament, and to ensure that polices are co-ordinated and sanctioned. In practice the 
Caucus is more of a briefing session than a forum for policy debate. With 266 ANC 
MPs in the current Parliament (and 252 in the 1994-99 Parliament) it is simply to big. 
The study groups are more important in this respect. For each Parliamentary 
committee the ANC MPs have established separate study groups which discusses and 
formulates policy and relates to the ANC ministers and similar study groups 
established by the ANC outside Parliament.  
 
There are no proper studies or analysis of the inner workings of the ANC 
parliamentary group, but it seems safe to conclude that two tendencies are discernible. 
On the one hand there is the emergence of a visible groups of professional ANC 
parliamentarians with both a technical and political skills to make an impact at 
national policy making. This is achieved through the work in the committees, in the 
on-going dialogue with Ministers and senior government officials, and with civil 
society. This is evident in a number of policy areas such as justice, defence, trade and 
industry and others. The public hearings in the various committees appear to be 
particularly important in broadening and opening up the policy-making process.  
 
On the other hand, and as expected given the context and the ANC’s origin and 
ideological outlook, ANC MPs see themselves as party representatives whose primary 
allegiance is to the party at large. This is also regulated in the 1994 code of conduct 
for ANC MPs:  
 
”All elected members shall be under the constitutional authority of the highest 
decision-making bodies of the ANC, and decisions and policies of the highest 
                                                        
5 This discussion is partly based on Mathisen (2000a). See also Kotzé (2000). 
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ANC organs shall take precedence over all other structures, including ANC 
structures in Parliament and government”. (Mathisen 2000a: 156) 
 
The code of conduct further forbids the MPs from any 
 
“attempt to make use of the parliamentary structures to undermine 
organisational decisions and policies” (Mathisen 2000a: 156). 
 
This is also confirmed through interviews with ANC parliamentarians: ”We have a 
PR-system where people don’t elect individuals, but the ANC”. (Mathisen 2000a: 
156). The same is made clear from the parliamentarians’ reaction to the controversial 
economic policy programme GEAR, which shifted economic policy in a neo-liberal 
direction. It was formulated by the party leadership and was presented to the MPs as a 
fait accompli, but the ANC MPs voted in favour of it. ANC parliamentarian Ben 
Turok explains: ”we as MPs voted for it because we had to”, and goes on to say: ” I’m 
a disciplined member of the ANC and if the National Executive says to me “this is our 
policy”, even if I have not been consulted, I will support it” (Mathisen 2000b).  
 
There is always a difficult balancing act for a dominant majority parliamentary group 
between implementing party policy and exercising control over the Cabinet and 
executive implementation. It has been further complicated by the rule that Cabinet 
Ministers should also be MPs. The ANC record is also a mixed one. One obvious 
shortcoming illustrating this is the parliamentary questions where ANC MPs only 
asked a small minority of the more than 3300 questions tabled in the 1994-1999 
period. 
 
A celebrated case of how ANC parliamentary behaviour has been constrained by 
deference to the party leadership is the Sarafina II furore. In 1996 the Department of 
Health contracted a music play as a part of their information campaign against 
HIV/AIDS. A number of financial irregularities were discovered in the department’s 
handling of the case, and the minister Nkosazama Zuma was called before the 
portfolio committee on health to give evidence. Initially the minister refused, and only 
after the deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, instructed her to meet, she made herself 
available. During the hearing the ANC MPs chose “not to rock the boat” and did not 
ask any questions in the first one and a half hour. According to reports they “wriggled 
with discomfort, but remained mute” (Jacobs & Ngewema 1997), and an ANC MP 
admits “we were more concerned with damage control than we were with 
parliamentary accountability”. 
 
There also examples where the ANC MPs has shown great courage both in plenary 
debates, in committees and hearings, and in following up on reports from the Auditor-
General, the Public Protector and other statutory watchdog institutions. The current 
effort by a number of parliamentary committees to investigate South African arm 
purchases is a prime example. 
 
Following the election of Thabo Mbeki as the new President and leader of the ANC, 
there has been a growing centralisation of both administrative and party power. We 
have witnessed a reorganisation of the core executive, and efforts to undermine 
alternative sites of power within both the state and the ANC. Some argues that this 
represents a drift into both a one-party and authoritarian state, while others claim that 
 11
strong leadership is a requirement in South Africa and that this will necessitate a 
further centralisation of the state machine and stronger control of the ANC. 
 
We do not subscribe to the view that South Africa is sliding into authoritarianism and 
runaway leadership. The parliamentary group is strong and active and the ANC’s MPs 
still exercise weight and influence. There are significant formal and substantive 
checks on executive and personal power. It is also important to keep in mind that the 
ANC itself is also an effective constraint on the abuse of power. It has never had 
much organisational coherence and has always lacked effective internal discipline. 
Efforts to centralise have often promoted a spirit of rebellion rather than 
acquiescence. South Africa possesses well-organised interest groups and has a robust 
civil society. Its media, universities and religious institutions are powerful checks on 
leadership power. NGOs remain strong in oversight and critical policy review, and 
demonstrate both autonomy and the ability to shape policy-making.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The South African case confirms a general trend from new democracies in the North. 
Parliaments are important in the democratisation process and they have implications 
for the evolving political system. Institutionalisation has been an important feature of 
this development. 
 
The South African Parliament’s place in the new democracy was defined by the 
external environment culminating in the 1993 interim constitution. Here Parliament 
was given a prominent position in the democratic parliamentary system with 
substantial powers. These powers have been used by Parliament in putting their mark 
on democratic consolidation in South Africa. An important condition for its success is 
also the resources available to Parliament and its ability to rely on alternative 
expertise and knowledge available through universities, interest groups and others. 
These are resources not generally available in poorer African countries. 
 
We would still argue that these factors are not sufficient to explain the role of the 
South African parliament and its impact on policy-making. We would subscribe to the 
conclusions made in a study of the experiences of Asian parliaments:  
 
“the extent to which the legislature can influence public policy, or is 
permitted to, will be determined by elite and mass expectations of the 
institution” (Norton 1999: 186). 
 
Political culture thus emerges as an independent variable in the Asian experiences. In 
the South African context this implies a particular focus on the ruling ANC party 
which dominates parliament and are likely to continue to do for the foreseeable future. 
How committed are they to parliamentary politics and institutions? Our study has 
indicated a mixed experience, but we have also pointed out that parliamentary 
politics, rules and regulations have helped shape ANC’s approach. We have also 
witnessed the emergence of a strong cadre of professional parliamentary ANC 
politicians which can be expected to exercise more and more weight and influence in 
the future.  
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Summary
ISSN 0804-3639
The role of parliaments is a neglected topic in the study of
the democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa. This working
paper provides a case study of the South African parliament
from the first democratic elections in 1994 to the present. The
paper examines the external environment and the internal
characteristics of parliament and provides a description of the
institution. The second part discusses the dominant party, the
ANC, and its role in the evolution of parliament.
The paper concludes that the South African parliament has
substantial powers. These powers have also been used by the
new parliamentarians. An important condition for its success
is the resources available to Parliament and its ability to rely
on alternative expertise and knowledge available through
universities, interest groups and others. However, it is also
concluded that parliament’s ability to influence public policy
is critically dependent on the ruling ANC and their
commitment to parliamentary politics, rules and regulations.
